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EXIM Approved Loans for Chinese Investments in Africa
(including concessional loans),  1995-2007
Western donors have raised a number of objections to China’s
expanding economic presence in Africa. They have warned about
lack of transparency, the creation of new unsustainable debt, the
promotion of China’s commercial self-interest and the absence of
conditionalities, especially with regard to governance. This
Development Viewpoint suggests, in contrast, that Africa has the
potential to benefit from economic cooperation with China
(see Oya 2006 as background).
The activities of the Chinese Export-Import Bank (EXIM),
established in 1994 and the country’s biggest official lender to
Africa, exemplifies China’s rising investment in the region. By the
end of 2007, it had approved a total of US$ 23.9 billion in loans to
Africa. This included the signing in 2007 of a massive project in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) worth almost US$ 9 billion,
to be invested over a number of years. Note the rising trend of
EXIM investments in Africa illustrated in the figure.
Over half of the EXIM Bank’s total loans have gone to Africa, where
they have been allocated mostly for large infrastructure projects,
often linked to developing trade in energy, minerals, metals and
other primary commodities. Some of these loans are concessional
and, together with grants, constitute the growing Chinese aid
programme in the region, estimated to be between US$ 500 million
and US$ 800 million per year. China’s official Africa aid target for
2009 is to reach US$ 1 billion.
Chinese direct investment, both concessional and commercial, has
gone to over 20 African countries and has increased significantly in
such resource-rich countries as Angola, Chad, DRC, Gabon, Nigeria,
Sudan and Zambia.
Despite the spectacular increase of Chinese investment and aid in
Africa over the past eight years, its current magnitude remains
limited compared to flows from OECD countries. Total aid (ODA)
from all donor countries to sub-Saharan Africa was over US$ 30
billion in 2005. Total FDI flows increased to US$ 18 billion from just
over US$ 4 billion in the mid-1990s.
According to data from China’s Ministry of Commerce, recorded
Chinese FDI to sub-Saharan Africa increased from about US$ 70
million in 2003 to over US$ 419 million in 2006. Thus, it clearly remains
a relatively small fraction of total FDI to the region. It is also a small
share of China’s own total outward FDI (e.g., only 3.2 per cent in 2005).
Western Donor Practices
China tries to consistently adhere to the principle of “non-
interference in other countries’ internal affairs”. Thus, it is often
blamed for its lack of criticism of undemocratic regimes. While
recognizing the basis for such criticism, this Development Viewpoint
focuses on the problems created by the practices of Western donors
and the potential effect of Chinese aid on the resulting constraints.
It is revealing that in December 2007, Robert Zoellick, the President
of the World Bank, announced that it had agreed to work with
China’s EXIM Bank on development projects in Africa. Chinese loans
are competing, in effect, with those from the World Bank, while
having the advantage of being free of the heavy baggage of
conditionalities often attached to Bank loans under the ‘augmented
Washington Consensus’.
Because donors such as the World Bank insist on imposing external
conditionalities, African policymakers have progressively lost the
‘policy space’ that they need to formulate their own development
strategies and experiment with a meaningful range of policy
Source: Own calculations based on data published in Davies et al. 2008, Appendix II.
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options. Since the 1980s, aid flows from rich countries have been
closely linked to requirements for market-oriented policy reforms.
More recently, conditionalities have multiplied, so that they now
cover the whole gamut of economic, social, institutional and
political reforms.
African countries—especially those highly dependent on foreign
aid—find themselves at an increasing disadvantage because there
are few policy alternatives that are feasible (i.e., backed by external
resources). Their policymakers, consultants and academics are
increasingly being trained to embrace a pro-market ideology and
encouraged to tie their careers to such an approach. Thus, donors
are able to advertise that their externally imposed development
‘consensus’ is really ‘nationally owned’.
In the process, a New Aid Agenda has become hegemonic: it
combines neoliberal economic and institutional reforms with
poverty reduction under an overarching umbrella of ‘good
governance’. But ‘good governance’ is narrowly equated, in practice,
with the institutional framework of an Anglo-American laissez-faire
model of capitalism.
Such uniformity of views is being justified by the 2005 Paris
Declaration, which has put a premium on greater alignment
and harmonization of donor efforts. Although harmonization
can, no doubt, reduce the transaction costs resulting from the
fragmentation of aid, the drawback is that donors often confront
individual low-income countries as a ‘cartel’ that lobbies in unison
for orthodox policy reforms—which are often spawned and
spearheaded by the Bretton Woods institutions.
The Counterweight of Chinese Support
China’s increasing support to the economic development of African
countries and its focus on providing much-needed infrastructure
and useful technical assistance—without dictating national forms
of governance—could provide a welcome counterweight to donor
cartels and restrictive conditionalities.
China’s development cooperation is motivated, of course, by
economic and diplomatic self-interest—namely, by China’s drive
to secure vital resources, open new markets, widen investment
opportunities and forge new political alliances. But has the history
of western donors been any different? It would be disingenuous to
claim otherwise.
In addition to refraining from interfering in internal affairs and in
African institutions, China’s cooperation appears to have several
other advantages: it is more flexible, takes a longer-term
perspective, is more cost-effective, and is faster in execution.
Countries in Africa have the potential to take advantage of the
counterweight offered by Chinese development cooperation (as well
as other South-South development cooperation from such countries as
India and Brazil) to gain more ‘policy space’ and wield greater leverage
in bargaining with both traditional and emerging donors.
One potential benefit could be the reduction of excessively
constraining conditionalities, which are also ultimately ineffective.
Of course, it would be incumbent on African countries to use this
additional ‘policy space’ productively.
More importantly, Africans could use such latitude to learn from
the variegated experience of other developing countries. Prominent
among these advantages would be learning useful concrete lessons
(rather than striving to mechanically incorporate entire alternative
‘models’) from the heterodox development policies of East Asia,
and from China in particular.
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